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This book is written by people that have been for the most part policy mak-
ers but have also had a keen eye on what the academic literature has had to
say. Appropriate to their positions therefore, the intention is to draw those les-
sons that are unequivocal and thus commonly accepted in the literature. But
in doing that, they also aim to remain ﬂexible enough in their analysis, in
order to be able to deviate from those prescribed recommendations when the
implementation of monetary policy requires it. Pragmatism therefore, is what
the reader feels the authors aim to bring in the discussion.
The book is split into two chapters. The ﬁrst chapter touches on a widely
agreed upon fact that the way the private sector forms expectations about
inﬂation affects the Central Bank’s ability to achieve its objectives. Tying
down expectations becomes therefore, of great importance. The authors then
argue that in order to do that, one needs to aim at achieving credibility as a
monetary policy authority which in turn comes by revealing a very clear and
well understood price stability objective. Now, while the literature is very clear
in identifying this issue and its relevance, it is less clear in helping the Central
Bank design reactions in its day-to-day activities. Achieving the latter requires
the use of “judgement” and thus a more eclectic application of the numer-
ous recommendations available. Demonstrating why this may be superior in
terms of effectiveness becomes naturally difﬁcult. They thus opt for showing
two examples which were unique in terms of the level of uncertainty that pol-
icy makers have had to operate in. These are the German uniﬁcation and
the creation of a pan-European monetary authority, the European Central
Bank. As both of these events were unique in their occurrence, the authors
argue that they constitute good examples of “uncharted territory” and there-
fore, appropriate cases where the lack of information and knowledge had
required that monetary policy “. . .keep a ﬁrm sense of direction, while relying
on judgement . . .”.
The second chapter then discusses in greater detail the implications of hav-
ing to operate within an uncertain environment. The authors concentrate
here on uncertainty about information lags or misperceptions of unobservable
variables, namely the output gap, and how central bankers make inferences
about the economy. At the same time they address the issue of expectations
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explicitly, by allowing them to be endogenous in the system. Through choos-
ing to examine growth the reader is reassured that, despite their conservatism,
central banks are not inﬂation “nutters”. Nevertheless, the prescription they
arrive at is very much in line with Rogoff’s conservatism, in that as output
variability is very much the result of persistent inﬂationary or deﬂationary
outcomes, what is required is a sufﬁciently low weight on output gap stabili-
sation in the CB’s objectives.
The main lessons that the authors draw from these two summary chapters are
3-fold:
1. It is important to identify and apply “robust results of monetary eco-
nomics” in order to build credibility. Beyond that however, the implementa-
tion of monetary policy in the short-run and tackling shocks as they occur,
require the application of judgement.
2. One such robust result that modern monetary economics has arrived
at is that expectations about inﬂation are as important in affecting the ﬁnal
inﬂation outcome as are the actions of the monetary authorities themselves.
Making an effort to align those with the objectives of the Central Bank,
through communication and transparent operations, is by consequence as
important as the actual interest rate decision itself.
3. Three, in turn, features help tie those expectations down: “primacy to
the price stability objective, rule-based behaviour. . . , and a ﬁrm response to
inﬂationary shocks”.
The book is sensible both in terms of the choice of issues that it addresses
as well as in what lessons it draws. Who could argue against the beneﬁts of
credibility or indeed the seriousness of having to operate under great sources
of uncertainty? Next to that then, the book is commendable in its attempt to
explain, through examples, the actual application of monetary policy and how
real problems are tackled. What the book is not however, is an attempt to
push the frontiers of our understanding forward or indeed add new insights
to well established problems. But then again, is it the job of central bankers
to push those frontiers, or is it their job to identify the common denominator
in the plethora of interpretations available and simply implement what “ﬁts
best”? Central Bankers often argue that what they need is to be as predictable
as possible, so much so, that achieving a state of “boringness” becomes a vir-
tue in its own right! (Lambert, 2004). By this measure then – and paraphras-
ing the famous ﬁlm – this book is an excellent example of Central Bankers
as “conformists with a cause”.
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